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Galileo’s
Mathematization of
Nature at the Crossroad
between the Empiricist
and the Kantian
Tradition
Michela Massimi
University College London
The aim of this paper is to take Galileo’s mathematization of nature as a
springboard for contrasting the time-honoured empiricist conception of phe-
nomena, exempliªed by Pierre Duhem’s analysis in To Save the Phenomena
(1908), with Immanuel Kant’s. Hence the purpose of this paper is twofold.
I) On the philosophical side, I want to draw attention to Kant’s more robust
conception of phenomena compared to the one we have inherited from Duhem
and contemporary empiricism. II) On the historical side, I want to show
what particular aspects of Galileo’s mathematization of nature ªnd a coun-
terpart in Kant’s conception of phenomena .
1. Introduction
Current philosophy of science has been characterised by a lively and ongo-
ing debate between two main positions: realism and empiricism. The for-
This paper originates from another paper on Kant’s view of phenomena, presented at the
Royal Institute of Philosophy Annual Conference “Kant and Philosophy of Science Today”
(UCL, 2–3 July 2007), and published in Massimi (ed.) Kant and Philosophy of Science Today
(2008). I am very grateful to the audience of the Kant conference and in particular to
Roberto Torretti, Michael Friedman, Hasok Chang, for very helpful comments. An earlier
version of this paper was presented at the British Society for Philosophy of Science and
at the &HPS1 conference in Pittsburgh (October 2007): I am grateful to the audiences
there, especially Peter Achinstein, John Norton, Don Howard, Peter Machamer, Ernan
McMullin, John Worrall for most thought-provoking and constructive criticisms. I am
also grateful to Katherine Dunlop for helpful advice on the notion of postulate at Galileo’s
time, and to Domenico Bertoloni Meli for discussion on Galileo’s axiomatization of the sci-
ence of motion. Many thanks ªnally to the archivists of King’s College Cambridge for ac-
cess to the Keynes collection of Galileo’s Opere.
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mer claims that the aim of science is to discover the truth about nature;
the latter denies the very same possibility to discover truth, and deªnes
the aim of science as that of ‘saving the phenomena’. This is an area where
integration with history of science can be particularly helpful in clarifying
some methodological assumptions at stake in this debate. Discussions
about the aims of science can indeed be illuminated by looking at what
scientists believed and did as part of their scientiªc practices, and whether
and how their attitudes towards theories and experiments may provide
support for one interpretive line over another. An interesting example of
such integration between history and philosophy of science on this speciªc
issue of realism vs. empiricism, can be found for instance in Peter Achin-
stein’s recent article on the diverse philosophical attitudes of Maxwell,
Ostwald, and Duhem, as to the reality of atoms. By contrast with Max-
well’s realism, Duhem exempliªes the empiricist position in claiming that
“atomic theories are examples of theories about an unobservable material
world underlying observable phenomena; (. . .) such theories cannot be es-
tablished to be true or false by physical science” (Achinstein 2007,
p. 370). Any scientiªc theory that goes beyond the observable phenomena
in postulating unobservable entities (e.g. atoms) risks falling into the
realm of “‘metaphysical theories’ postulating occult causes” (Achinstein
2007, p. 369), according to Duhem. No wonder, Duhem’s judgment is
not conªned to atoms but extends to Aristotelian physics as well as New-
tonian physics with its attractive force acting at a distance. As Achinstein
points out:
For Duhem empirical science begins with ‘sensible appearances’
(e.g., light), which can then be represented in what he calls an ‘ab-
stract and general form’ (e.g., by means of mathematical rays sub-
ject to experimental laws of reºection and refraction). He distin-
guished this legitimate activity from the illegitimate one of
inferring hypothesis about an unobservable reality underlying sen-
sible appearances and their abstractions. (2007, p. 373)
Duhem’s empiricist attitude is nicely illustrated, among other works, in a
series of historical essays called To Save the Phenomena (1908), where he
traced the philosophical tradition of saving the phenomena back to Plato
and to what he called the method of the astronomer. For centuries, the aim of
ancient Greek astronomy was, according to Duhem, to introduce hypothe-
ses that could save the phenomena, as opposed to hypotheses that could
give a true story about celestial bodies. This is because, as ancient astrono-
mers knew well, there could be more than one hypothesis compatible with
the available data (e.g., epicycles or eccentric circles):
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Very different hypotheses may yield identical conclusions, one sav-
ing the appearances as well as the other. Nor should we be sur-
prised that astronomy has this character: it shows us that man’s
knowledge is limited and relative, that human science cannot vie
with divine science. . . . In more than one respect, Proclus’ doctrine
can be likened to positivism. In the study of nature it separates, as
does positivism, the objects accessible to human knowledge from those that
are essentially unknowable to man. But the line of demarcation is not
the same for Proclus as it is for John Stuart Mill. . . . By extending
to all bodies what Proclus had reserved for the stars, by declaring
that only the phenomenal effects of any material are accessible to
human knowledge whereas the inner nature of this material eludes
our understanding, modern positivism came into being. (Duhem
[1908] 1969, pp. 21–2; emphasis added)
Not surprisingly, Duhem himself subscribed to this positivist / empiricist
tradition. Indeed, after a detailed historical reconstruction of how the Pla-
tonic tradition passed on from Medieval Christian Scholasticism to
Osiander’s Preface to Copernicus’ De revolutionibus, Duhem took a look at
the turning point marked by Galileo’s new sciences. According to Duhem,
it was only with Galileo that the philosophical trend of ‘saving the phe-
nomena’ stopped and reversed. By contrast with the method of the astron-
omer, Galileo introduced the method of the physicist: astronomy had to con-
form to reality, rather than saving the phenomena. This was the task that
Galileo set for himself in the case of Copernican astronomy, and that led
him to clash with religious authorities, who by contrast had welcomed
Osiander’s quasi-empiricist preface to De revolutionibus. Duhem famously
concluded: “Despite Kepler and Galileo, we believe today, with Osiander
and Bellarmine, that the hypotheses of physics are mere mathematical
contrivances devised for the purpose of saving the phenomena. But thanks
to Kepler and Galileo, we now require that they save all the phenomena of
the inanimate universe together” ([1908] 1969, p. 117).
Latching onto Achinstein’s analysis of Duhem’s skepticism toward at-
oms, we can see that this is part of a much bigger philosophical picture
Duhem subscribed to. Duhem was championing the empiricist tradition
of saving the phenomena that many empiricist philosophers of science still
nowadays support (see van Fraassen 1980; 1985; and 2006). According to
Duhem’s reconstruction, the empiricist tradition has a distinguished pedi-
gree, going back to ancient Greek astronomy, Osiander, Bellarmine and
modern positivism.1 From a historical point of view, Duhem’s so-called
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1. Duhem’s historical reconstruction is of course open to question. For example, his
analysis of Copernican astronomy has been disputed by Barker and Goldstein (1998), while
continuity thesis, that is, the thesis that there was no abrupt discontinu-
ity in the transition from medieval to early modern science, has been re-
evaluated against Kuhnian historiography. From a philosophical point of
view, Duhem’s empiricism and his polemic with the realism he saw in Co-
pernicus and Galileo, has also been re-appraised in all its conceptual nu-
ances.2 I am not going to enter into this literature on Duhem because the
focus of this paper is Galileo. Galileo’s mathematization of nature is his-
torically at the crossroad of rival philosophical traditions about the aims of
science. For scientiªc realists, Galileo was one of the fathers of the
scientiªc revolution: he fought for the view that science gives us a true
story about the way things are in nature. For Duhem and the empiricists,
on the other hand, Galileo marks the end of the tradition of saving the
phenomena but in a way, his was a Pyrric victory.
In this paper, I want to go back to Galileo’s mathematization of nature
as a springboard for contrasting this time-honoured empiricist attitude
with another important philosophical tradition, which has been surpris-
ingly overlooked by historians and philosophers of science. This is the tra-
dition that goes back to Immanuel Kant and that is equidistant from the
realist and the empiricist one. From a Kantian perspective, the aim of sci-
ence is not to put forward true theories; nor is it to save the observable
phenomena and suspend belief about unobservable entities (as empiricists
maintain). Rather, from a Kantian perspective, as I want to suggest in this
paper, the aim of science is to constitute phenomena according to the condi-
tions of possibility of human experience. This is the transcendental task
that Kant set for himself by asking “how is pure mathematics possible?”
and “how is pure natural science possible?”. Transcendental philosophy
was Kant’s answer to these questions, and the identiªcation of what he
called the “conditions of possibility of experience,” namely those condi-
tions of human cognition that have to be in place for us to have any expe-
rience of the world around us.
The key intuition behind Kant’s view was to downplay the gap that for
centuries empiricism envisaged between sensible appearances—intended
as what appears to our senses—and an underlying unobservable reality that
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his rather controversial judgment on Galileo has attracted renewed attention among histo-
rians and philosophers of science (see for instance Ariew and Barker 1990; Jaki, 1984; Mar-
tin 1982, 1991).
2. For instance A. Goddu (in Ariew and Barker 1990, p. 312) tried to defend Duhem
from stereotypical realist accusations and to show that “Duhem seems self-consistent in
maintaining a qualiªed instrumentalism as regards physical theories and laws while hold-
ing a qualiªed, if regulative, realism as regards our ordinary experience and deeper meta-
physical intuitions. This is, I believe, one of the sources of the confusion in discussions of
Duhem’s positivism and realism”.
goes beyond our capacities of knowing. Kant would agree with Duhem
that whenever we go beyond the sensible appearances towards an underly-
ing unobservable reality, we can discover nothing and we can only lose
ourselves in what Kant called the antinomies of reason. However, by con-
trast with Duhem, Kant had a more substantial notion of ‘appearances’
than what appears to our senses. Nor should Kant’s claim that our knowledge
is conªned to phenomena be confused with phenomenalism. As I am go-
ing to clarify in section 2, Kant developed a new conception of phenom-
ena, which ªnds a natural counterpart in some salient aspects of Galileo’s
mathematization of nature. Indeed, Kant’s new conception of phenomena
is patterned upon Galileo’s in believing that science can reveal nature’s
lawfulness, against Bellarmine and followers.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. I) On the philosophical side, I want
to draw attention to a (Kantian) more robust conception of phenomena
than the one we have inherited from Duhem and contemporary empiri-
cism.3 II) On the historical side, I want to show some salient aspects of Ga-
lileo’s mathematization of nature that ªnd echoes in Kant’s philosophical
analysis. It is neither my purpose to enter into exegetical analyses of Kant,
nor to engage with scholarly interpretations of Galileo. The literature on
both sides is immense, and goes well beyond my competence and my pur-
pose here. Instead, my more modest purpose is to illustrate the Kantian
stance on Galileo’s mathematization of nature, as an alternative reading of
Galileo compared to the empiricist one exempliªed by Duhem.
In my illustration of the Kantian stance on Galileo, I make use of
Duhem’s continuity thesis. I focus my analysis on Galileo’s new science of
motion (rather than on his defence of Copernican astronomy), and I show
how in his demonstration ex suppositione of the law of free fall, Galileo used
the force concept of ‘impeto’ or ‘momento’, which, although reminiscent
of the Medieval impetus theory of Buridan and Oresme, is in fact as dis-
tant from it as from the later Newtonian dynamics. So, although most
of current Galilean historiography shares Duhem’s continuity thesis in
highlighting the continuity with Medieval science, and especially with
Archimedean hydrostatics, the philosophical readings of Galileo are not
themselves necessarily Duhemian (one might even venture to say that his-
toriography underdetermines the choice of philosophical readings).4 In other
words, one can endorse Duhem’s continuity thesis at the historical level,
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3. I have addressed this issue already in Massimi (2007), and especially in Massimi
(2008), from which this paper originates.
4. This is not entirely surprising since even during Duhem’s time, Duhem’s historical
and philosophical views were not perceived as necessarily connected. I thank an anonymous
referee for pointing this out.
while rejecting his empiricism at a philosophical level. This is precisely
my strategy in this paper.
In section 2, I brieºy present Kant’s view on phenomena, and how it
differs substantially from the empiricist one. In section 3, I discuss Kant’s
stance on Galileo and why Galileo is repeatedly mentioned by Kant as an
example of his “Copernican revolution” in philosophy. In section 4, I turn
to Galileo himself and his demonstration of the law of free fall, from the
early study in De motu antiquiora (1590) to Discourses and Mathematical
Demonstrations concerning Two New Sciences (1638). By latching onto W. L.
Wisan’s scholarly interpretation of Galileo, I try to clarify what aspects of
Galileo’s mathematization of nature ªnd their counterpart in Kant’s con-
ception of phenomena. This section touches on some delicate and rather
controversial aspects of Galileo’s scientiªc methodology, and tries to high-
light the analogies with the Kantian analysis presented in section 2 and 3.
The result of this combination of Kantian philosophy and Galilean history
is to provide an alternative perspective to the well-established empiricist
one on Galileo.5
2. Beyond Empiricism: Kant’s New Conception of Phenomena
The original motivation behind Kant’s soi-disant ‘Copernican revolution’
in philosophy was a sense of dissatisfaction towards the empiricist tradi-
tion that dominated British philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth
century. Despite some important insights, such as David Hume’s criticism
of causation, for Kant the empiricists barred themselves from the possibil-
ity of explaining how our scientiªc knowledge of nature is possible:
The famous Locke, . . . because he encountered pure concepts of the
understanding in experience, also derived them from this experi-
ence, and thus proceeded so inconsistently that he thereby dared
to make attempts at cognitions that go far beyond the boundary of
all experience. David Hume recognised that in order to be able to
do the latter it is necessary that these concepts would have to have
their origin a priori. But since he could not explain at all how it is
possible for the understanding to think of concepts that in them-
selves are not combined in the understanding as still necessarily
combined in the object, and it never occurred to him that perhaps
the understanding itself, by means of these concepts, could be the
originator of the experience in which its objects are encountered, he
thus, driven by necessity, derived them from experience
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5. A very authoritative Kantian reading of Galileo was offered by Cassirer (1906),
(1927). The more modest aim of this paper is to latch contemporary Kantian perspectives
in philosophy of science to the history of Galileo’s demonstration of the law of free fall.
(namely, . . . custom). . . . The empirical derivation, however, to
which both of them resorted, cannot be reconciled with the reality
of scientiªc cognition a priori that we possess, that namely of pure
mathematics and general natural science, and is therefore re-
futed by the fact (Kant 1781/1787, B127–8; emphases in the origi-
nal).6
Starting from what—echoing the sentence above—the neo-Kantian Mar-
burg school in the nineteenth-century called the ‘fact of science’, the only
way of explaining how scientiªc knowledge is possible is by assuming that
it has (in part) an a priori source in our understanding. Empiricism pre-
cluded itself from the possibility of explaining the ‘fact of science’, and led
to Humean skepticism at best.
Hence, the necessity to operate what Kant famously described as his
“Copernican revolution” in philosophy, according to which “our represen-
tation of things as they are given to us does not conform to these things as
they are in themselves but rather these objects as appearances conform to
our way of representing” (Kant 1781/1787, Bxx). Instead of asking: ‘how
can we bridge the gap between scientiªc hypotheses and evidence?’; ‘Do
hypotheses give us a true story about the way things are in nature, or do
they simply save the phenomena?’; Kant realised that the above questions
are ill-posed, and, as such, bound to remain open. According to Kant, we
should instead ask a different type of question: namely, how objects as
they appear to us (as appearances) can conform to our way of representing (and
not the other way around).
We should immediately avoid a possible misunderstanding. When
Kant speaks of appearances that have to conform to our way of represent-
ing, ‘appearances’ should not be confused with things as they appear to our
senses as empiricism would have it, and as still Duhem meant it, as we saw
in the Introduction. For Kant, appearances are not perceptual states. In-
stead, for Kant, the possibility of perception is deªned in terms of confor-
mity to a set of a priori conditions of sensibility such as space and time.
What is then given to us as appearances, for Kant, are spatio-temporal objects
as given to the mind in empirical intuition (through space and time as a
priori forms of sensibility). It is at this point that we have to mark an im-
portant distinction between appearances and phenomena.
At the outset of the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant deªned an appearance
as “the undetermined object of an empirical intuition” (A20/B34). Ap-
pearance refers then to a spatio-temporal object as merely given to the
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6. As it is custom, A refers to the ªrst edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781),
while B refers to the second and substantially modiªed edition (1787). I shall henceforth
use the Guyer and Wood (1997) English translation.
mind in empirical intuition and conceptually still “undetermined,” not
brought yet under the categories of the faculty of understanding. A phe-
nomenon, on the other hand, is a conceptually determined appearance, namely
an appearance that has been brought under the categories of the under-
standing. Kant gives a detailed analysis of this distinction in the Third
Chapter of the Analytic of Principles, where he says that “appearances, to
the extent that as objects they are thought in accordance with the unity of
the categories, are called phenomena” (A249).
From a Kantian perspective then, we gain scientiªc knowledge of na-
ture by subsuming appearances (i.e. spatio-temporal objects as given to
our mind in empirical intuition) under concepts of the understanding (via
schemata). Our scientiªc knowledge is conªned to phenomena intended as
conceptually determined appearances. Phenomena are not what appear to our
senses. Kant’s Copernican solution to the problem of explaining how
scientiªc knowledge is possible, can be found—I want to suggest—in the
revolutionary new conception of phenomena that he put forward in oppo-
sition to the empiricist tradition.
Kant introduced the notion of a priori to justify how we can have
scientiªc knowledge (i.e. mathematical, geometrical and physical knowl-
edge), which derives from experience and yet is apodictically certain.
Scientiªc knowledge takes the form of ‘synthetic a priori judgments’,
based on the interplay of what Kant called the faculty of sensibility (with
its a priori forms of space and time) and the faculty of understanding (with
its a priori categories and principles, such as causality, among many oth-
ers). Of course, the Kantian notion of a priori has been at the centre of an
ongoing debate since the beginning of the twentieth century, when with
the advent of relativity theory and quantum mechanics, the apodictic cer-
tainty of Euclidean geometry and Newtonian mechanics, which Kant
meant to justify with his notion of ‘synthetic a priori judgments’, has been
proved false.
An entire generation of philosophers and physicists, from Hans
Reichenbach to Ernst Cassirer to Hermann Weyl, engaged with the vexed
question of how to salvage the salvageable in Kant’s system, when the very
foundations of the system proved to be on shaky grounds.7 And as early as
1920, in an important book entitled Theory of Relativity and A Priori
Knowledge, Hans Reichenbach made an important distinction between two
possible meanings of the Kantian notion of a priori: i) a priori means ªxed
and unrevisable for all times; but it also means ii) constitutive of the object of
experience. In the light of the scientiªc revolutions of the twentieth century,
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7. For an excellent analysis of how the reception of relativity theory was ªltered
through Kantianism, see Ryckman (2005).
Reichenbach concluded that while the ªrst meaning of the Kantian notion
of a priori is untenable (nothing is ªxed and unrevisable in the history of
physics, and we now have a better theory, relativity theory, which has re-
placed Newtonian mechanics that Kant thought to be the state of the art);
on the other hand, the second meaning of the Kantian a priori maintains
all its validity for modern physics. In other words, according to Reichen-
bach, the main function of the Kantian a priori was to make experience of
nature possible, i.e. to lay down the conditions of possibility of our scientiªc
knowledge of nature. This is what it means to be constitutive of the object of
experience.
For instance, causality, which Kant took to be an a priori principle of
the faculty of understanding (what he called ‘the second analogy of experi-
ence’) and which, following Hume, he believed is not in nature itself, but
is instead projected onto nature by the human mind, can be regarded a
priori in the second (Reichenbachian) sense. More generally, for Kant the
analogies of experience are constitutive principles because they “seek to bring
the existence of appearances under rules a priori” (A179/B221), that is, they
determine how appearances can be ordered temporally. For example, we
can order temporally the appearance of motion according to the succession
of cause and effect. Kant saw causality instantiated in nature via moving
forces as the causes of determined effects. In particular, he saw in Newton’s
impressed force F—as captured by Newton’s second law—an expression of
causality with respect to the accelerated motion imparted on a body as an
effect.8 Even if we now have a better scientiªc theory (general relativity)
and no longer identify—as Kant did—causality with an impressed force F
causally responsible for the acceleration of bodies as per Newton’s second law
(F ma), nonetheless we can retain the idea that causality is a constitutively
a priori element of our experience of nature: that is, it has to be in place for
us to be able to have scientiªc knowledge of nature and to identify
Humean empirical regularities as lawlike.
This is the meaning of the Kantian notion of a priori that in recent
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8. Kant identiªed Newton’s three laws of motion with ‘metaphysical principles of nat-
ural science’, whose transcendental counterparts are the three analogies of experience (i.e.
substance, causality and community) in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,
chapter 3. Some philosophers (Friedman 1992a, 1992b) have interpreted this move as an
attempt to secure the ‘synthetic a priori’ nature of Newton’s law of gravitational attraction,
which would be ‘synthetic’ because derived from observed motions of planets as recorded
by Brahe and Kepler, and ‘a priori’ because of the transcendental back-up that causality
provides as a principle of the understanding via the notion of an impressed force as per
Newton’s II law, from which the law of universal gravitation can be deduced. Other
Kantian scholars (Allison 1994; Buchdahl 1969 and 1974) have questioned this interpre-
tation of Kant in favour of a ‘looseness of ªt’ between the transcendental apparatus, on the
one hand, and Newtonian physics, on the other hand.
time Michael Friedman (2000; 2001) has stressed, building up on Reich-
enbach’s original intuition. Friedman has defended what he calls relativized
a priori principles as, on the one side, vindicating the Kantian idea of con-
stitutive elements of a scientiªc framework, and, on the other side, as rela-
tive to it, and revisable during a scientiªc revolution. Hence a resultant
form of ‘dynamic Kantianism’. ‘Dynamic Kantianism’ is a fascinating at-
tempt to reconsider and adapt Kant’s transcendental philosophy to mod-
ern science, by disentangling it from the fortunes of Newtonian mechanics
and Euclidean geometry, upon which it was originally patterned. Most
importantly for the purpose of my paper, dynamic Kantianism provides
the philosophical lens, through which we can look at the history of science
and at the historical evolution of scientiªc theories in the same spirit that
motivated Kant’s original desire to answer the question of how scientiªc
knowledge is possible.
In the following two sections, I give a slightly new twist to this
Reichenbachian–Friedmanian notion of constitutive a priori by showing
how it enters directly into what in my view is Kant’s richer conception of
phenomena. In Section 3, in particular, I show that Kant saw in physical
forces in nature the expression of the constitutive a priori principle of causal-
ity. Building up on Friedman’s analysis of the Metaphysical Foundations of
Natural Science, I show how in an important work called “Transition from
the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics” and pub-
lished in the Opus postumum, Kant saw in the historical evolution from Gal-
ilean kinematics to Newtonian dynamics the search for moving forces as
the causes of appearances, and hence ultimately as a way of transforming ap-
pearances into phenomena, qua objects of scientiªc knowledge. The implica-
tions of the constitutive a priori for Kant’s conception of phenomena has
not been analysed in the recent Kantian literature: and the goal of this pa-
per is to elucidate precisely such implications.
Here below I clarify this Kantian epistemological insight by looking at
one speciªc historical episode that Kant repeatedly mentioned in various
works in strict conjunction with his “Copernican revolution”: namely, Ga-
lileo Galilei’s demonstration of the law of free fall. Indeed, in the Preface
to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1787), as a paradig-
matic example of his Copernican revolution Kant chose precisely Galileo
(as well as Torricelli and Stahl), and his famous experiment with the in-
clined plane:
When Galileo rolled balls of a weight chosen by himself down an
inclined plane, . . . a light dawned on all those who study nature.
They comprehended that reason has insight only into what it itself
produces according to its own design; that it must take the lead
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with principles for its judgements according to constant laws and
compel nature to answer its questions, rather than letting nature
guide its movements by keeping reason, as it were, in leading-
strings; for otherwise accidental observations . . . can never connect
up into a necessary law, which is yet what reason seeks and requires.
Reason, in order to be taught by nature, must approach nature with
its principles in one hand, . . . and, in the other hand, the experi-
ments thought out in accordance with these principles—yet in or-
der to be instructed by nature not like a pupil, who has recited to
him whatever the teacher wants to say, but like an appointed judge
who compels witnesses to answer the questions he puts to
them. . . . This is how natural science was ªrst brought to the se-
cure course of a science after groping about for so many centuries.
(Bxiii–xiv, emphases added)
Galileo is here portrayed as the scientist who paradigmatically accom-
plished the revolutionary shift that Kant was urging for: namely, the shift
from the empiricist view that our scientiªc knowledge of nature proceeds
from nature itself to the opposite Kantian view, according to which “we
can cognize of things a priori only what we ourselves have put into them”
(Bvxiii). The certainty and secure foundation achieved by natural science
from the time of Galileo onwards was—to Kant’s eyes—the paradigmatic
expression of this shift. Reason must approach nature with its principles on
the one hand, and with experiments thought out in accordance with these
principles, on the other hand. We should therefore take a look at Kant’s
new conception of phenomena in close connection with his position on
Galileo’s mathematization of nature.
3. Kant on Galileo’s Mathematization of Nature
In what follows, I want to clarify the particular stance Kant took on Gali-
leo against the empiricist tradition exempliªed by Duhem’s aforemen-
tioned remarks. Kant too, like Duhem, saw in Galileo a turning-point in
the history of science, but for very different reasons. By asking how pure
natural science is possible, Kant was trying to justify why we do in fact
have a new science of nature from the time of Galileo onwards, against the
empiricist tradition that takes nature as a bunch of phenomena to be saved
by introducing hypotheses that cannot be proved to be true. In particular,
I concentrate my analysis on Kant’s last, and incomplete work “Transition
from the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics” pub-
lished in the Opus postumum. Indeed, it is in this last and never completed
work, which in Kant’s intentions was meant to ªll a gap that he felt was
still open in his critical philosophy after the Critique of Judgment, that
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Kant’s new conception of phenomena is discussed in strict relation to Ga-
lileo’s mathematization of nature.9
Kant wrote the “Transition to physics” in the last years of his life (fasci-
cles Xth and XIth are dated around 1799–1800, just four years before
Kant’s death in 1804), when under the inºuence of Lavoisier’s chemical
revolution and the recent discoveries in pneumatic chemistry and ether
theories, he became increasingly concerned with the problem of ground-
ing a system of empirically given forces in nature.10 The problem is that in na-
ture we may observe objects moving, changing physical state (from solid
to liquid to gaseous) or displaying some properties (for example, being
elastic). But these are only appearances [Erscheinungen], for Kant. Only
when we introduce moving forces as the underlying causes that make the
objects move in a certain way, or change physical state or displaying some
physical or chemical properties, do we have a conceptually determined ap-
pearance or phenomenon as the proper object of scientiªc knowledge.
I think this is the crucial, distinctively new feature that Kant intro-
duced in the conception of phenomena: a physical phenomenon—
intended as a conceptually determined appearance—has built in it from
the very outset the concept of a moving force as the cause of the observed
appearance. It is the causal concept of a moving force that distinguishes
phenomena from appearances, or better, that transforms appearances into
phenomena, that is, into objects of experience. If this analysis is correct, we
can begin to catch a glimpse of the radically new conception of phenom-
ena that Kant was introducing. Physical phenomena have built into them
the concept of, say, a dynamic cause responsible for the observed appearances
and their kinematical properties. Appearances are related to phenomena as
kinematics is related to dynamics. Physical phenomena are constituted by
applying dynamical concepts to kinematical appearances, where by phe-
nomena being constituted I mean—in the original Kantian sense—that
phenomena require and presuppose the principle of causality as a constitu-
tive a priori principle that ªnds its counterpart in the dynamical concept of
a moving force. No wonder, the search for a system of moving forces be-
came central to Kant’s “Transition to physics.”
We can envisage here an interesting link with Duhem. While Duhem
listed Newtonian mechanics with its attractive and repulsive forces acting
at a distance among the ‘metaphysical’ theories postulating occult causes,
Kant gave a very different story about Newtonian mechanics. According
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9. I have discussed in more detail the new conception of phenomena outlined in Kant’s
“Transition to physics” in Massimi (2008), on which I draw here.
10. For an illuminating analysis of how Lavoisier’s chemical revolution somehow ªnds
echoes in this last incomplete work of Kant, see Friedman (1992a) chapter 5; for an alter-
native analysis of the “Transition,” see Eckart Förster (2000).
to Kant, those forces, far from being occult causes, were the physical ex-
pression of the fundamental role the a priori principle of causality plays in
the constitution of phenomena (as a constitutive a priori principle).11 The fun-
damental role that in the “Transition to physics” Kant assigned to moving
forces, in particular to Newton’s gravitational attraction, as the efªcient
cause of appearances, e.g. of relative motions of planets kinematically de-
scribed by Kepler as well as of relative motions of free-falling objects de-
scribed by Galileo, sits squarely with the interpretive line I am suggesting
about Kant’s new conception of phenomena. Most importantly, to Kant’s
eyes, Galileo paved the way to Newton by offering a kinematical analysis
of free fall that Newton completed with his dynamical concept of gravita-
tional attraction:
The laws of motion were sufªciently established by Kepler’s three
analogies. They were entirely mechanical. Huygens knew also of
composite yet derivative motion. . . . But no matter how close they
both [came to postulating universal gravitation]—for Galileo had
long before that given the law of the gravity of falling bodies at
heights which led to an approximately equal moment in their
fall—all that which had been achieved remained empiricism in the doc-
trine of motion, and there was as yet no universal principle properly
so-called, that is, a concept of reason, from which it would be possible
to infer a priori to a law for the determination of forces, as from a
cause to its effect. This solution was given by Newton, inasmuch as he
gave the moving force the name attraction, by which he made ap-
parent that this cause was effected by the body itself immediately,
not by communication of the motion to other bodies—thus, not
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11. “Motion can be treated entirely mathematically, for it is nothing but concepts of
space and time, which can be presented a priori in pure intuition; the understanding makes
them. Moving forces, however, as efªcient causes of these motions, such as are required by
physics and its laws, need philosophical principles. All mathematics, then brings one not
the least bit nearer to philosophical knowledge unless a causal combination, such as that of
attraction and repulsion of matter by its moving forces, is ªrst brought onto the scene and
postulated for the sake of appearances. As soon as the latter occurs, the transition to physics
has taken place, and there can be philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica. This step was
taken by Newton in the role of a philosopher who brings new forces onto the scene. . . .
Once Kepler’s three analogies had grounded all the mathematically determined laws of
motion of the planets by sufªcient observation, there yet remained the question for physics
regarding the efªcient cause of this appearance; Newton, in order to ªnd a way out of this
difªculty, built a bridge from mathematics to physics, namely the principle of an attractive
force. . . . according to the law of the inverse square of the distance. He did not, thus, rest
content with appearances, but brought into play a primordially moving force” (Kant
“Transition,” Ak 22:516 in Kant [1936, 1938] 1993; emphasis added).
mechanically, but purely dynamically. (Kant ‘Transition’, Ak 22:
528 in Kant [1936, 1938] 1993; emphases added)
The passage from what Kant calls empiricism in the doctrine of motion to a
proper science of nature, namely to Newton’s philosophiae naturalis principia
mathematica, runs parallel to the passage from kinematics to dynamics:
from spatio-temporal appearances that can be described kinematically, to
Newtonian physical phenomena, whose kinematical properties can be traced
back to dynamic causes (that is, gravitational attraction).12 Galileo occu-
pies a central role in this passage. No wonder Kant mentioned Galileo not
only in the Preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason but
also in the Opus postumum. In what follows, I want to clarify how Kant’s
revolutionary new conception of phenomena may have been patterned
upon Galileo’s investigation of nature; or better, how some aspects of the
latter may have inspired the former.
In the next section I take a historical look at Galileo’s demonstration ex
suppositione of the law of free fall. The purpose of this historical section is to
clarify the crucial role Galileo played in the passage from Aristotelian to
Newtonian mechanics, and more precisely, to highlight some aspects of
Galileo’s mathematization of nature that can be interpreted in a Kantian
way, that is, as a step towards the constitution of the new phenomenon of
uniformly accelerated free-falling objects, in between Aristotle’s theory of
natural motion and Newton’s later theory of gravitational attraction.
4. Galileo and the Law of Free Fall: Science between Reason and
Experiment
In the past four decades, Galileo’s scientiªc methodology has been at the
centre of a voluminous literature that in various ways has combined de-
tailed historical investigations of Galileo’s manuscripts and folios with a
re-assessment of some traditional philosophical views of Galileo as a ratio-
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12. It must be noted here that what Newton in the Principia called the phenomena,
from which he deduced the law of gravitational attraction, were simply relative motions of
satellites around their main planets or relative motions of planets around the Sun as de-
scribed by Kepler’s laws (I thank Torretti and Achinstein for stressing the different uses of
the expression ‘phenomena’ in Newton and in Kant). Thus, in a way, what Newton called
‘phenomena’ is closer to what Kant would probably call ‘appearances’. On the other hand,
the very same fact that Newton deduced the law of gravitational attraction from them may
suggest that these appearances (in Kant’s terminology) hinted already at the dynamic con-
cept of an attractive force as their cause, which is precisely the way Kant interpreted New-
ton’s deduction of the law of gravitational attraction starting from ‘appearances’ (namely,
relative motions of planets around the Sun) and Newton’s second law (instantiating the a
priori principle of causality in the form of an impressed force F responsible for changes in
velocity, following Friedman’s analysis).
nalist and a Platonist, mainly due to Alexander Koyré’s (1939) inºuential
historiography. Thanks to the acute analyses of Settle (1961), Drake
(1973a; 1973b; 1974), Naylor (1974; 1977), McMullin (1967), among
others, from the 1960s–70s onward increasing attention has been paid to
Galileo the experimenter, and important studies have been conducted
on Galileo’s use of machines (lever, pendulum, balance, inclined plane; see
for instance Machamer 1978; 1998b). Going beyond the stereotypical di-
chotomy of Galileo the experimenter versus Galileo the mathematician,
Galileo’s scientiªc methodology has been rediscovered in all its complex-
ity and nuances.
As mentioned in the Introduction, it is not my goal here to enter into
scholarly interpretations of Galileo nor to take one side rather than an-
other. Instead, my goal is to highlight some salient aspects of Galileo’s
mathematization of nature that have been recognised by Galilean scholars,
and show how these aspects can be interpreted along Kantian lines. In
other words, I am not going to claim that Galileo was a rationalist as op-
posed to an empiricist, nor that Kant’s analysis of Galileo is historically
the correct one. I am simply not making a historiographic point about Ga-
lileo here. Instead, what I am going to claim is that there are aspects of
Galileo’s mathematization of nature that ªnd a natural counterpart in
Kant’s conception of phenomena and can hence explain why Kant chose
Galileo to illustrate his Copernican revolution in philosophy.
In particular, I refer to W. L. Wisan’s historical analysis of Galileo and
to the methodological difference she noted between Galileo’s approach to
astronomy and his approach to mechanics. Contra Duhem, Wisan claims
that Galileo seemed to have followed the Platonic tradition behind the
method of the astronomer in believing that astronomy resorted to hypotheses
and consequences derived from the hypotheses, although in his defence of
Copernicanism he strived to show that there is only one correct hypothesis
and it is possible to prove wrong any alternative one.13 However, this was
not the method Galileo used in the science of mechanics and the new sci-
ence of motion, where Wisan would agree with Duhem that Galileo intro-
duced a brand new method of the physicist:
his chief obstacle in completing the new science of motion arose
precisely from the fact that it required new principles not immedi-
ately evident in the sense Galileo believed necessary. Far from using
the modern method of hypothesis, deduction and experimental
166 Galileo’s Mathematization of Nature
13. “His method in astronomy was not that of the mathematician who derives true con-
clusions from true principles but that of deriving conclusions from hypotheses, conªrming
the conclusions by observations and showing that all alternative hypotheses which are pro-
posed must fail” (Wisan 1978, p. 14).
veriªcation, Galileo never quite saw that the principles of mechan-
ics, once made evident by reason and immediate experience, could still be
falsiªed through remote consequences. (Wisan 1978, p. 4; emphasis
added)
In the new science of motion, by contrast with astronomy, Galileo strived
to provide a secure foundation in terms of self-evident and indubitable
principles. While astronomy relied heavily on observations and experi-
ence, Galileo thought that in the science of motion, there are a few funda-
mental principles from which it should be possible to derive the whole
body of knowledge. If it is possible to identify these self-evident and indu-
bitable principles through reason and immediate experience, then since true
conclusions follow from true premises, the whole issue of testing empirical
consequences so as to ascertain empirically the validity of the new science
of motion becomes superºuous. Finding self-evident and indubitable
principles for the new science of motion became Galileo’s central issue,
right from the beginning in his Pisan treatise De motu (1590–2) up to his
ªnal masterpiece Discourses and Mathematical Demonstrations on Two New
Sciences (1638). In this section, I take a brief look at Galileo’s life-long at-
tempt to provide a solid foundation to the new science of motion. It is not
my aim to reconstruct the history of how he discovered the law of free fall,
or what sort of experiments with the inclined planes he performed, or
what type of data he may have had available for drawing his conclusions.
Excellent and authoritative historical studies on this topic have already
been conducted, to which I could hardly add anything.14 Instead, more
modestly, my goal here is to take a philosopher’s look at Galileo’s scientiªc
methodology in the science of motion. I want to show that Kant’s repeated
emphasis on Galileo’s approaching nature with principles of reason and ex-
periments ªnds a natural counterpart in Galileo’s search for self-evident
and indubitable principles to ground his new science of motion, namely
principles that—to use Kant’s terminology—may be known to be true a
priori, i.e. known to be true independently of experience, or better, despite the
lack of sufªciently strong evidence.15
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14. In addition to the pioneering historical studies mentioned above, for a more recent
historical analysis see Palmieri (2006).
15. This is Kant’s original deªnition of ‘a priori’. As Caygill (1995), p. 36, notes: a pri-
ori judgments arise “‘independently of experience’ as opposed to those a posteriori modes
of knowledge which are ‘borrowed solely from experience’ (A 2). They are independent of
experience in that they do not contain any ‘admixture’ of sensibility and in that they may
not be derived from it. Kant argues further that they . . . are even the condition of experi-
ence”. This original deªnition of the Kantian a priori precedes and grounds of course the
later Reichenbachian–Friedmanian re-interpretation of some a priori principles, such as
causality, in terms of “constitutive of the object of experience”. As we shall see below, there
4.1. Aristotelian A Priori versus Kantian A Priori: Galileo’s Search
for Self-Evident and Indubitable Principles in the Science of
Motion
A ground-clearing clariªcation is necessary at this point. It may be ob-
jected that no one was more against any aprioristic reasoning than Galileo,
as his long polemic with the Aristotelians easily testiªes to. One of the
most eloquent examples, for instance, can be found in his letters on sun-
spots (1613) against the Aristotelian Jesuit Christopher Scheiner, who had
written a treatise claiming that the spots recently revealed by the new
telescope could not have been sunspots because the sun as any other celes-
tial body is incorruptible. Similar aprioristic lines of reasoning can be
found in Simplicio’s defence of Aristotle in the Dialogue concerning the two
chief world system (1632), where as Wisan points out “Simplicio has claimed
that Aristotle always began a priori, showing the necessity of his conclu-
sions ‘by means of natural, evident, and clear principles’ and only after-
ward supported these a posteriori by means of the senses” (Wisan, 1978,
p. 31; quotation from Galileo [1632] 1962; second edition 1967, p. 50).
Hence we should clearly distinguish and not confuse the Aristotelian no-
tion of ‘a priori’ that Galileo attributed to Simplicio and that he was at
pains to avoid,16 and the chronologically much later Kantian notion of ‘a
priori’, which—if my interpretive analysis is correct—Kant saw at work
in Galileo’s scientiªc methodology. The Aristotelian notion criticised by
Galileo starts from allegedly ‘natural, evident, and clear principles’ (such
as the incorruptibility of celestial bodies) to draw physical conclusions
that may well go against any available experimental evidence, as in the
case of the sunspots revealed by the new telescope.
The Kantian notion of a priori is much more complex than Simplicio’s:
as clariªed in section 2, a priori means constitutive of the object of experience
and this is the relevant Kantian notion of a priori that still applies today.
Having clariªed this distinction between the Aristotelian a priori and the
Kantian a priori, what remains to be shown is to what extent this Kantian
notion of constitutive a priori can arguably be seen at work in Galileo’s sci-
entiªc methodology.
I want to suggest that a plausible candidate for the Kantian notion of
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is an important step in Galileo’s demonstration of the law of free fall where he introduces a
postulate which he presents to be true independently of experience, or better—as I said
above—true despite the lack of sufªciently strong evidence. This postulate embeds a causal
/ dynamical concept that—I will suggest—can be regarded as “constitutive of the object of
experience” in the later Reichenbachian–Friedmanian sense clariªed in Section 2.
16. The Aristotelian version of the ‘a priori’ that Galileo ascribed to Simplicio is not
necessarily Aristotle’s, for whom a priori principles are themselves based on experience in
rather complex ways. I thank an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to this point.
constitutive a priori can be found in Galileo’s search for self-evident and in-
dubitable principles to ground his new science of motion. In the science of
motion, Galileo endorsed the mathematicians’ and geometers’ axiomatic
method, exempliªed by Euclid’s Elements, whereby true and indubitable
principles are established through reason and immediate experience alone as axi-
oms, from which true theorems follow. Those true, self-evident, and indu-
bitable principles cannot be established a posteriori via observation and
experiment at the cost of losing their axiomatic, apodeictic character. Ga-
lileo repeatedly mentioned his search for such principles, most famously in
his 1604 letter to fra’ Paolo Sarpi where he originally announced the (mis-
taken) law of free fall (v:s) and spoke of “totally indubitable principles”
from which to derive his propositions. A propos of this, Wisan notes:
One result of Galileo’s conversion by the mathematicians was an ex-
cessive rationalism as shown . . . in his treatment of accelera-
tion. . . . Similarly, his ªrst study of motion along inclined planes
[De motu] had little bearing on the behaviour of physically real bod-
ies on physically real planes and it resulted in a number of curious,
unveriªable propositions. . . . [In Two New Sciences] we ªnd him still
assuming the mathematical model: true conclusions must be de-
rived from true and evident principles. . . . But Galileo’s science of
motion . . . required principles which he could not establish accord-
ing to this ideal. (Wisan 1978, p. 10 and 37)
Indeed, that Galileo’s experiments with the inclined plane had little bear-
ing on the actual behaviour of physically real bodies on physically real
planes is also conªrmed by another Galilean scholar R. H. Naylor (1974,
p. 113, 115, 116), who in a detailed study of Galileo’s experimental evi-
dence for the law of free fall concluded
What does seem certain is that Galileo noticed the persistent dis-
crepancy between his theory and observations. . . . The view that
Galileo would roll spheres down an incline, compile a list of obser-
vations, and then realise his total inability to interpret the informa-
tion certainly seems a little out of character. Was Galileo such an
ardent empiricist? I doubt it. . . . Although we know Galileo had
discovered his law of free fall by 1604, it is difªcult to establish for
certain how and when he ªrst obtained a conclusive experimental
conªrmation. . . . The law, according to which distances travelled
from rest during an accelerated motion were always proportional to
the time squared, had little observational evidence to support it.
In the following sub-sections, I want to try to make sense of what Wisan
calls Galileo’s “excessive rationalism”, and his life-long search for indubi-
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table principles for his new science of motion. In section 4.2, I take a brief
look at Galileo’s original treatise on accelerated motion, De motu
antiquiora, written in his early Pisan years between 1589 and 1592, and
containing some seminal ideas for his later analysis of free fall. In sec-
tion 4.3, I turn to Galileo’s main work on the subject, Discourses and Math-
ematical Demonstrations concerning Two New Sciences, written during the last
years of his life in 1638. In particular, I am going to focus on the principle
that Galileo employed to ground his times-squared law of free fall: it con-
sists of an important supposition (‘supposizione’), which despite Galileo’s
best efforts could not be proved to be self-evident and indubitable, and
whose truth is ultimately established independently of experience and by rea-
son alone.
4.2 Galileo’s De motu antiquiora
The experiment Kant refers to in the Preface to the Critique of Pure Reason
is Galileo’s famous experiment with the inclined plane, which he began to
perform at a very early stage of his career, when he was in Pisa around
1590. Motion through an inclined plane is easier to study than vertical
motion because the moving objects can be slowed down (depending on
the angle of inclination of the plane): this was indeed an experimental sit-
uation that could be measured with the instruments available at Galileo’s
time. Through these experiments, Galileo famously found that spaces
were to one another as the squares of the times (and this held for all possi-
ble inclinations of the plane). As we shall see in the following section 4.3,
Galileo offered a mathematical demonstration of the times-squared law
in Two New Sciences (1638), where he adopts the literary ªction of mak-
ing Salviati read a treatise in Latin entitled De motu locali written by what
Salviati refers to as his Academic friend, namely Galileo, who wrote in-
deed a treatise called De motu antiquiora during his early Pisa period be-
tween 1589–1592 (probably around 1590, although the book was never
published).17
Already in this early Pisan treatise, Galileo’s aim was to prove that
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17. The original manuscript is part of Manoscritti Galileani conserved at the Biblioteca
Nazionale Centrale in Florence. Antonio Favaro published it as part of his twenty-volume
Opere di Galileo Galilei, but following a different order from the one of the original manu-
script. Many of the observations announced in Two New Sciences had already been discussed
by Galileo in this early treatise. For an introduction to the history of this manuscript, in-
cluding its relation to other similar treatises on motion by some of Galileo’s colleagues in
Pisa (Francesco Buonamici and Girolamo Borro), see Wallace (1998). For an excellent, de-
tailed analysis of De motu locali see Wisan (1974). For a historical reconstruction of the role
of Galileo’s kinematical studies for the following history of Newtonian dynamics, see
Westfall (1971).
Aristotelians were wrong in claiming that free-falling bodies were moving
towards a natural place. Against Aristotle’s theory of motion towards a
natural place (up or down), Galileo argued that there is in fact only one
type of motion (down) that he explained in analogy with Archimedes’
hydrostatics by considering the ratio between weight per volume of
the body and weight per volume of the surrounding medium. Thus, if
bodies seem sometimes to move upwards, this is not because they move
towards a natural place (as Aristotle claimed) but because they must have
a speciªc weight that makes them, so to speak, ‘ºoat’ in their surrounding
medium.18 Of course, there was an immediate problem with this analysis:
if the velocity of a free-falling body is directly proportional to its speciªc
weight, the body can only move with uniform velocity. How is it possible
to account for accelerated motion? In order to account for the possibility
of accelerated motion, Galileo had to take the distance from the naïve view
that related speeds to weights, and articulate an explanation of accelerated
motion as due to the gradual decay of the force that originally pushed the
body up to the starting point of the free fall. It is worth quoting in some
detail Wisan’s authoritative view on Galileo’s scientiªc method here:
Galileo gives what he considers a brilliant demonstration that ac-
celeration in free fall is ‘accidental’ since it is caused by the gradual
decay of the impressed force which raises the body to the point
from which it begins to fall. Acceleration is thus shown to be an
unnatural (or violent) motion. Here we ªnd a ‘resolutive method’
being explicitly employed by Galileo as he announces that this is
the method by which the cause of the effect was investigated: huius
effectus causam indagemus, haec resolutiva methodo utemur. . . . From this
principle [i.e. gradually decay of the projecting force], it follows
that at some point the projecting force will no longer be sufªcient
to raise the projected object, at which point the object begins to ac-
celerate downward.. . . The principle found is neither discovered
nor established by the resolutive method but has already been
rendered evident by numerous arguments and examples (in Chap-
ter 17). ‘Discovering the true cause’ thus means discovering which known
principle provide the ground for the given proposition. (Wisan 1978, p. 9;
emphasis added)
Let me stress two main points with respect to Wisan’s analysis. First, Gali-
leo’s use of the so-called ‘resolutive method’ as a method for ªnding ‘true
causes’ for a given effect (accelerated motion) testiªes to Galileo’s commit-
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18. On the Archimedean origins of Galileo’s theory of motion, see Machamer (1998b)
and Westfall (1971, ch. 1).
ment to causal explanations in his kinematical studies. The search for ‘true
causes’ so understood should not be confused or conºated with Galileo’s
reluctance to engage with the Aristotelian hypothetico-deductive proce-
dure of speculating about the possible causal hypotheses of a motion so ac-
celerated, which—as will be clariªed in section 4.3—he dismissed as “fan-
tasies”.19 As Wisan nicely put it, ‘discovering the true cause’ for Galileo
does not mean to speculate about possible causal hypotheses, because his
method in the science of motion is not the hypothetico-deductive one.
Rather, for Galileo, ‘discovering the true cause’ means discovering what
known principle can provide the ground for a given proposition (e.g., ac-
celerated motion of free-falling bodies). This leads me to the second point
I want to make. Galileo identiªed the ‘true cause’ with the principle of a
projecting force gradually decaying, which was not discovered empirically
but—as Wisan says—was “rendered evident by numerous arguments and
examples (in Chapter 17)”. This principle is indeed the ancestor of the
very similar principle that Galileo employed about forty years later in the
mathematical demonstration of the times-squared law of free fall in Two
New Sciences (1638), as we shall see in section 4.3.
It took Galileo some time to correct the basic mistake of searching for a
sort of Archimedean-like relation between velocity change and speciªc
density, rather than searching for velocity change with respect to time
(which seems to date back to 1609). However, already in De motu antiqui-
ora, Galileo opposed to Aristotle’s cause of motion (i.e., motion towards a
natural place) his own search for true cause (vera causa). What was cru-
cially still missing, and always missed in Galileo’s story is the later New-
tonian notion of gravitational attraction. Although Galileo spoke of the
heaviness (gravitas) of bodies characteristic of all matter, he did not have
and never had a positive dynamic account of the nature of gravitas, i.e. of
the dynamic force responsible for uniformly accelerated motion. In the Dia-
logue concerning the two Chief World Systems (1632), for instance, he wrote:
We do not really understand what principle or what force it is that
moves stones downward, any more than we understand what moves
them upward after they leave the thrower’s hand, or what moves
the moon around. We have merely . . . assigned to the ªrst the
more speciªc and deªnite name “gravity”. (Galileo [1632] 1962,
p. 234)
Galileo’s notion of ‘gravity’ is at quite a distance from Newton’s later no-
tion of an external accelerating force acting at a distance, and because of its
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19. I thank Ernan McMullin for drawing my attention to Galileo’s rejection of the Ar-
istotelian “fantasies”.
Archimedean origins, it is closer to the idea of an internal static force of a
body. At the same time, it is also at quite a distance from the Medieval
impetus theory of Buridan and Oresme.20 It is in this speciªc sense, equi-
distant from the impetus theory and Newton’s later dynamics, that Gali-
leo sometimes spoke of momentum gravitatis as a (weight-related) force con-
cept causally responsible for the accelerated motion of free-falling bodies,
and hence for their degrees of velocity acquired (celeritatis momenta). We
can see here at work Duhem’s continuity thesis: Galileo’s concept of mo-
mentum gravitatis—which sometimes he simply referred to as momento (in-
terchangeably with impeto)—bears continuity with the Medieval impetus
theory. Indeed, Galileo shared with it the idea of an internal static force
of a body that he still thought of as related to the concept of weight/
heaviness. At the same time, as anticipated in the Introduction, despite
this continuity, there is a revolutionary new element in Galileo’s analysis
of free-fall that was not anticipated by Buridan or Oresme’s impetus the-
ory. In the next sub-section, I try to clarify this revolutionary new ele-
ment: namely, Galileo’s use of this (weight-related) force concept in his
demonstration ex suppositione of the law of free fall.
4.3. Galileo’s De motu locali in Two New Sciences
There is a surprising continuity between the two aforementioned points
we have just discussed about De motu antiquiora (1590), and some of the
themes in Galileo’s later mathematical demonstration of the law of free
fall in Two New Sciences (1638). In the Third Day of Two New Sciences, in the
Section on ‘Naturally accelerated motion’, Galileo begins with a declara-
tion that sounds like a manifesto against the empiricist tradition of ‘sav-
ing the phenomena’:
And ªrst of all it seems desirable to ªnd and explain a deªnition
best ªtting natural phenomena. For anyone may invent an arbitrary
type of motion and discuss its properties; thus, for instance, some
have imagined helices and conchoids as described by certain mo-
tions which are not met with in nature . . . but we have decided to
consider the phenomena of bodies falling with an acceleration such
as actually occurs in nature and to make this deªnition of acceler-
ated motion exhibit the essential features of observed accelerated
motions. (Galileo [1638] 1914, p. 160)
Galileo deªnes uniformly accelerated motion as the motion that “starting
from rest, it acquires, during equal time-intervals, equal increments of
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20. On the relationship between Galileo and Newton on forces and inertial problems,
see Hooper (1998).
speed [temporibus aequalibus aequalia celeritatis momenta sibi superad-
dit]” ([1638] 1914, p. 169). In other words, a uniformly accelerated mo-
tion is such that the ratio between v (i.e. the equal increments of speed
or celeritatis momenta) and t (i.e. equal time-intervals) is constant. There
follows a series of objections by Sagredo and Simplicio, including
Sagredo’s speculations about the possible cause of uniformly accelerated
motion, to which Salviati replies
The present does not seem to be the proper time to investigate the
cause of the acceleration of natural motion concerning which vari-
ous opinions have been expressed by various philosophers, some ex-
plaining it by attraction to the center, others to repulsion between
the very small parts of the body while still others attribute it to a
certain stress in the surrounding medium which closes in behind
the falling body and drives it from one of its position to another.
Now, all these fantasies, and others too, ought to be examined; but
it is not really worth while. At the present it is the purpose of our
Author merely to investigate and to demonstrate some of the prop-
erties [‘passioni’] of accelerated motion whatever the cause of this accel-
eration may be. ([1638] 1914, pp. 166–7; emphasis added)
The expression ‘fantasies’ in this quotation echoes the similar expression
Galileo used in reference to the Aristotelians in a letter of 1616 (Galileo
Opere IV, p. 521) that Wisan quotes to support her thesis that Galileo’s
scientiªc method was very different from the traditional hypothetico-
deductive one: “The Aristotelians are criticised because instead of proceed-
ing deductively step by step, they form from their fantasia a proposition
from which they go immediately to the conclusion they want to prove”
(Wisan 1978, p. 30).
The refusal to investigate the causes of uniformly accelerated motion in
the quotation above should be understood—I want to suggest, latching
onto Wisan’s analysis—as a stance against the tradition that takes phe-
nomena as ready-made, and reduces science to introducing a series of hy-
potheses that can save them (that is, the same tradition that Duhem saw
exempliªed in what he called the method of the astronomer). Galileo seems to
be taking distance from this tradition in declaring himself not interested
in speculating about the causal hypotheses that can save the phenomenon
of uniformly accelerated motion. Instead, he is interested in demonstrat-
ing “some attributes of a motion so accelerated.” As we shall see below,
this important methodological declaration can help us understand why
Galileo’s method has nothing to do with hypothetico-deductivism, that is,
with the procedure of introducing hypotheses, testing their empirical con-
sequences and hence verifying one hypothesis over others available. In this
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respect, Galileo anticipates Newton’s methodological hypotheses non ªngo.
On the other hand, as anticipated in section 4.2, I also want to suggest
that the aforementioned quote should not be read as an expression
of Galileo’s disinterest in searching for the causes of uniformly acceler-
ated motion tout court. True, Galileo’s main concern was kinematics, not
dynamics: he wanted to demonstrate the kinematical properties of uni-
formly accelerated motion. But at the same time, both in De motu antiqui-
ora and—as we shall see shortly—in Two New Sciences, he resorted to a
(weight-related) force concept causally responsible for the kinematical
properties of uniformly accelerated motion. And this fact, in conjunction
with his life-long search for a link between the Archimedean science of
weight and the new science of motion, in my opinion, testiªes to the ac-
tual level of interest Galileo had in discovering the ‘true causes’ of such
motions, in continuity with the method already employed in De motu
antiquiora.21 Let us then take a closer look at Galileo’s mathematical dem-
onstration of the kinematical properties of free-falling objects.
It is at this point of the Third Day of Two New Sciences that Salviati in-
troduces a key assumption or, as he calls it, a supposition: “This deªnition
established, the Author makes a single assumption, namely: the speeds ac-
quired by one and the same body moving down planes of different inclina-
tions are equal when the heights of these planes are equal” (Galileo [1638]
1914 , p. 169). This is the key assumption that is supposed to be true, and
from which Galileo’s demonstration of the law of free fall follows. Despite
the fact that Galileo knew of the law of free fall as early as 1604, following
a long period of experimenting with inclined planes in Padua, at the time
he still did not have what he called a natural principle from which to de-
duce the law. And the fact that thirty-four years later in Two New Sciences,
when almost blind and under house-arrest in Arcetri, he felt the need to
spell out the key assumption or supposition behind the mathematical
demonstration of the law of free fall testiªes to the central role that this
supposition plays in Galileo’s mathematization of nature, and, more in
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21. Apropos of searching for causes, Machamer (1978, p. 162 and 173), has pointed out
that “Galileo is unconcerned about extrinsic, efªcient causes (. . .) and concerned very
much with formal and ªnal causes, and sometimes material causes. (. . .) Such efªcient
causes [as those Galileo referred to as ‘fantasies’ in Third Day] leave us in the realm of
opinion about the nature of the effects and the nature of the causes which brought them
about. For proper demonstrations we need formal, ªnal, and material (necessitating)
causes, as found in the mathematical tradition”. I agree with Machamer’s analysis that Ga-
lileo does not endorse the standard Aristotelian notion of efªcient cause, which lands us in
the realm of opinion and fantasy. Instead the later Kantian notion of causality as a constitu-
tive a priori principle seems to me to capture Galileo’s scenario much better, as I shall ex-
plain here below.
general, the central role he ascribed to the axiomatization of the new sci-
ence of motion.22
The supposition says that the speeds acquired by the same body de-
scending along say the inclined planes CA and CD, respectively, are equal
since the heights of theses planes are equal, namely CB [see Figure 1].
More in general, this is the same speed that would also be acquired by the
body falling vertically from C to B. In order “to increase the probability
[of this assumption] to an extent which shall be little short of a rigid
demonstration”, Salviati presents the following thought experiment
(‘esperienza’).23
Imagine a vertical wall with a nail driven into it, and from the nail let
us suspend a ªne vertical thread with a lead bullet from A to B [see
Fig. 2]. Then consider the horizontal line DC, at right angles to the verti-
cal thread AB. If we now bring the thread with the bullet into the posi-
tion AC and we set it free, we can observe it to descend along the arc
CBD, until it almost reaches the horizontal DC. From this we infer that
the bullet in its descent through the arc CB acquired a momentum
[‘impeto’] on reaching B which was sufªcient to carry it through a similar
arc BD to the same height. If we now drive another nail along the perpen-
dicular AB at the point E closer to the horizontal DC, when we set the
thread free from AC, it strikes upon the nail E and it traverses the arc BG
with E as a center. This is done by the same momentum [‘impeto’] which
previously starting at the same point B carried the same body through the
arc BD. If we now drive another nail F into the wall at an even lower point
on the vertical AB, and again we set the thread with the bullet free from
AC, the thread will traverse the arc BI terminating exactly on the horizon-
tal line CD. Salviati then concludes:
this experiment leaves no room for doubt as to the truth of our
supposition; for since the two arcs CB and DB are equal and simi-
larly placed, the momentum [‘momento’] acquired by the fall
through the arc CB is the same as that gained by fall through the
arc DB; but the momentum acquired at B, owing through the fall
through CB, is able to lift the same body through the arc BD . . .
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22. As Domenico Bertoloni Meli (2008) has pointed out, in the second and third day of
Two New Sciences Galileo’s main concern was with establishing an axiomatic science of mo-
tion on the example of Archimedes. Despite a voluminous historical literature in recent
times on Galileo’s experiments and machines, “his foundational efforts have attracted less
attention, yet they constitute a major episode in the history of science.”
23. The Italian ‘esperienza’ is translated in Crew and de Salvio as ‘experiment’. I trans-
late it as ‘thought experiment’ instead because there is an element of idealisation as indi-
cated by the verb ‘imagine’ in the following discussion about arcs and chords (we are as-
suming that there is no air resistance or friction etc.).
in general, every momentum acquired by fall through an arc is
equal to that which can lift the same body through the same arc.
But all these momenta which cause a rise through the arcs BD, BG,
and BI are equal, since they are produced by the same momentum,
gained by fall through CB, as experiment shows. Therefore all the
momenta gained by fall through the arcs DB, GB, IB are equal.
([1638] 1914, pp. 171–2)
This is further generalized and taken to be valid not just for arcs but also
for the chords subtended to these arcs. There is however an inferential leap
in this procedure and Salviati concedes that “we are not able, by similar
means, to show that the event would be identical in the case of a perfectly
round ball descending along planes whose inclinations are respectively the
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Figure 1
Figure 2
same as the chords of these arcs”. In other words, if instead of arcs we con-
sider the chords subtended to the arcs DB, GB and IB, a ball that has de-
scended along the chord CB would lose part of the momentum [impeto] it
acquired in the fall CB and would not be able to rise to the height of CD
along the inclined planes DB, GB and IB. This difªculty notwithstand-
ing, Salviati concludes “but this obstacle, which interferes with the exper-
iment, once removed, it is clear that the momentum [impeto] (which
gains in strength with descent) will be able to carry the body to the same
height. Let us then, for the present, take this as a postulate, the absolute
truth of which will be established when we ªnd that the inferences from
it correspond to and agree perfectly with experiment” ([1638] 1914,
p. 172).
Let me make two comments. First, I think we should note here an im-
portant difference Galileo introduces between what he calls a supposition
and a postulate. The experiment with the arcs is presented as a quasi-
demonstration of the supposition that the speeds acquired by a body mov-
ing down planes of different inclinations are equal whenever the heights
are equal. Whereas the supposition is presented as a principle whose truth
is almost indubitable and self-evident as the thought experiment with the
arcs is meant to show, the postulate is a counterintuitive assumption
that must be accepted to back up the quasi-demonstration generalized
from arcs to chords and hence to inclined planes.24 Galileo’s quasi-
demonstration of the supposition depends on accepting the postulate; but
the postulate is not itself self-evident and it goes in fact against intuitive
experience.25 Second, we can see how the (weight-related) force concept of
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24. I thank Katherine Dunlop for helpful advice on the notion of postulate at Galileo’s
time and the distinction between axioms/deªnitions vs. postulates, with a particular em-
phasis on the counterintuitive nature of postulates.
25. Wisan (1978) does not distinguish, as I do, the supposition from the postulate nec-
essary to back-up the supposition (following Galileo’s terminology) and refers to the sup-
position itself as a ‘postulate’, and sometimes as a ‘principle’. However, what she writes
about it is in agreement with my analysis: “To conªrm the postulate of equal speeds he had
a demonstration with a pendulum from which the motion of bodies along inclined planes
could be inferred by analogy. But neither of these provided a direct and exact visual dem-
onstration of the principle to be established, and in fact Galileo could only conªrm theo-
rems derived from these principles” (p. 40). And again, p. 42: “the postulate is to be estab-
lished by the method of hypothesis, deduction and experimental veriªcation as it is
understood today. Yet not a single experiment is offered to justify the postulate in this
way! Nor does he appear to have looked for such an experiment. . . . Instead he continues to
search for a more immediate demonstration or a deeper principle from which the postulate
might be derived. . . . Later, in a letter to Baliani, 1 August 1639, replying to criticism of
the way in which he tried to establish his postulate, Galileo admits that the principle he
has supposed does not seem to have that evidenza for which one looks in principles which
are to be assumed as known”.
impeto, whose ancestor was the gradually decay of the projecting force in
De motu antiquiora, is already at a distance from the Medieval impetus the-
ory (that is, an internal force keeping the projectile in motion) because of
the revolutionary new way in which Galileo used it in the thought experi-
ment with the arcs and the chords. In Galileo, ‘impeto’ is synonymous
with ‘momento’, and it is the product of a body’s weight and speed. Al-
ready in the Pisan work Le meccaniche, working on balances, Galileo had
deªned the ‘momento’ as the propensity of a body to move downwards be-
cause of its weight and its position on the balance. In Koyré’s words, “the
impetus of the moving body is nothing other than the dynamic impulse
given to it by its gravity” (Koyré [1939] 1978, p. 185). As Hooper (1998,
pp. 159–60) has illuminatingly pointed out “In motion on inclined
planes, the momenta gravitatis, which are due to the angle of descent, are
shown to be congruent to the momenta velocitatis given by the rules of
speed, and are taken as the explanation and cause of the latter.” Thus the
main function of this (weight-related) force concept is to causally explain
why bodies moving down different inclined planes (with the same height)
acquire the same degrees of speed. Galileo is using this force concept as
the cause of the kinematical properties captured by the supposition (that is,
equal degrees of speed over different inclined planes).
We can see in this speciªc aspect of Galileo’s mathematization of nature
a counterpart of Kant’s view on phenomena as ‘conceptualised appear-
ances’. For Kant, phenomena are constituted by subsuming appearances,
that is, spatio-temporal objects given in empirical intuition, under the
categories of understanding (for example, quality), among whose a priori
principles causality plays a key role. Most importantly, Kant saw in mov-
ing forces in nature an instantiation of the a priori principle of causality:
in particular, he saw in Newton’s gravitational attraction the principle
that causally explained a great variety of appearances (from free fall to
planetary motions) and could hence unify physics into a system. From a
Kantian point of view, this process of ‘constituting’ phenomena by sub-
suming appearances under an a priori principle such as causality can be re-
garded, in a way, as beginning with Galileo. Kant’s aforementioned re-
marks about Galileo’s kinematical studies as a way of approaching nature
via “principles of reason” and via “experiments thought out in accordance
with those principles” seems to ªnd a counterpart in Galileo’s procedure.
Galileo constituted the spatio-temporal properties of appearances such as
balls rolling down inclined planes (that is, equal degrees of speed over dif-
ferent inclined planes) and then subsumed them under a causal concept
(i.e. a weight-related force concept such as ‘impeto’ that entered into the
quasi-demonstration of the supposition). The new phenomenon of uni-
formly accelerated free-falling bodies can then be regarded—from a Kan-
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tian point of view—as the end product of this two-stage process: 1) ªrst,
we have to ‘constitute’ the spatio-temporal properties of appearances, i.e.
of balls rolling down inclined planes; and this is what Galileo’s supposi-
tion does by ascribing equal degrees of speed over different inclined
planes; and 2) we then have to subsume these spatio-temporal properties
under a causal concept (such as Galileo’s ‘impeto’ as the cause of the equal
degrees of speed over different inclined planes). But how did Galileo dem-
onstrate uniformly accelerated motion? How could he differentiate his
procedure from the ‘fantasies’ of the Aristotelians?
From the supposition, Galileo derived two theorems, in particular the
famous one is “[Theorem II] If a moveable descend from rest in uniformly
accelerated motion, the spaces run through in any times whatever are to
each other as the duplicate ratio of their times; that is, are as the squares of
those times.” The mathematical demonstration of this theorem, which
contains Galileo’s times squared law of free fall, is very ingenious indeed.
Galileo could not in fact avail himself of calculus to calculate instanta-
neous velocities. Nevertheless, he was able to prove that the ratio between
space intervals was equal to the ratio between the squares of the time inter-
vals required to traverse those spaces.
He imagined the ºow of time between any initial and ªnal instant A
and B as a vertical line AB, in which he identiªed some time intervals AD
and AE [see Figure 3]. He then represented the space with another vertical
line going from H to I, with space intervals HL and HM. How could he
prove that HM:HL  AE2 : AD2? He imagined another time line AC
drawn from A at any angle whatever with AB. Suppose we now draw par-
allel lines that from points D and E intersect the new time line AC in O
and P, respectively. The parallel line DO represents the maximum degree
of speed acquired at instant D of time interval AD, and EP the maximum
degree of speed acquired at instant E of time interval AE.26 In the previous
Theorem I, the so-called mean speed theorem, Galileo had proved that the
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26. The identiªcation of the parallel lines DO and EP with the maximum degree of
speed acquired respectively at instant D of time AD, and instant E of time AE is typical of
Galileo and had already been employed in Dialogue (1632, 28): “We may likewise suppose
that the degree of velocity acquired at a given point of the inclined plane is equal to the ve-
locity of the body falling along the perpendicular to its point of intersection with a parallel
to the horizon through the given point of the inclined plane”. In the absence of calculus, to
deªne instantaneous velocity Galileo resorted to the expedient of thinking velocity as the
sum total of ‘degrees of speeds’ geometrically represented by parallel lines composing the
surface of the triangle subtended to the inclined plane, with the triangle base representing
the maximum degree of speed acquired in uniformly accelerated motion at the bottom of
the plane, and the lines getting shorter and shorter until they reach 0 corresponding to the
top end of the inclined plane where the body is at rest. For an analysis of this procedure as
exposed in Galileo’s Dialogue, see Feldhay (1998, pp. 114–5).
time in which a certain space is traversed by a moveable in uniformly ac-
celerated motion from rest is equal to the time in which the same space
would be traversed by the same moveable carried in uniform motion
whose degree of speed is one-half the maximum and ªnal degree of speed
of the uniformly accelerated motion ([1638] 1914, 208).27 Hence Galileo
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27. This is because if we imagine a body descending through an inclined plane at time
t0. . .t2 and acquiring a further degree of velocity at any further instant, and if we now
imagine that at t2 the plane from inclined becomes ºat and perfectly horizontal, then we
would have that the ªnal and maximum degree of speed acquired in the uniformly acceler-
ated motion at t2 becomes the degree of speed that the same moveable would now have in
its uniform horizontal motion. This means that in the following two seconds t2. . .t4, the
moveable would travel with uniform velocity on the horizontal plane a distance, which is
exactly twice the distance it travelled in t0. . .t2 with uniformly accelerated motion. So in
the same time-intervals t, namely t0. . .t2 and t2. . .t4, the moveable covers twice the dis-
tance with uniform velocity. Hence with half uniform velocity (which recalls is equal to the
Figure 3
can now conclude that the spaces HM and HL are the same spaces that
would be traversed in times AE and AD by a moveable in uniform motion
whose degree of speed is one-half EP and DO (which, recall, represent the
maximum degree of speed at instant E and D respectively). Therefore, the
spaces HM and HL are in duplicate ratio of the times AE and AD. QED.
What is striking about this mathematical demonstration is the fact
that without calculus, Galileo was nonetheless able to arrive at the law of
free fall by identifying instantaneous velocities at points E and D through
what Machamer illuminatingly describes as a “comparative, relativized
geometry of ratios. . . . It measures one thing by showing its relation to
another, which then may be quantitatively compared by supplying some
arbitrarily or conveniently intelligible standards. . . . In this sort of geom-
etry, there are no absolute values, numbers that describe the true proper-
ties of things. . . . Using this geometry one does not look for physical con-
stants or solutions to problems in terms of absolute numerical values”
(1998b, p. 65). Indeed, Galileo did not give any numerical value for uni-
form acceleration; nevertheless the result he found about s at2 (when the
initial velocity is 0) smoothed the path to Newton, who identiªed the
moving force causally responsible for those accelerated motions with grav-
itational acceleration (a was replaced by the gravitational constant g).
I want to draw attention to Galileo’s deductive procedure of starting
with a supposition and a postulate and deriving a series of theorems from
them. As the analysis so far aimed to show, this procedure has nothing to
do with and should not be confused with hypothetico-deductivism. The
mathematical method that Galileo followed for the science of motion is
demonstrative and is meant to start from true and indubitable principles,
rather than from hypotheses. The problem, however, is that Galileo was in
fact unable to ªnd such self-evident and totally indubitable principles, as
we have seen. This has far-reaching implication for the philosophical de-
bate about saving the phenomena, with which I opened this paper.
Galileo marks indeed a turning-point in the tradition of saving the
phenomena, as Duhem rightly saw. If the aim of science were really that of
introducing hypotheses to save the phenomena, then Galileo would be no
more right than Aristotle. What appears to us as a free-falling object
could be accounted for either by the hypothesis of motion towards a natu-
ral place, with Aristotle, or by the hypothesis of uniformly accelerated
motion, with Galileo.28 And the role of Galileo’s experiment would simply
182 Galileo’s Mathematization of Nature
maximum and ªnal degree of speed of uniformly accelerated motion), it would cover ex-
actly the same distance it covered with uniformly accelerated motion on the inclined plane.
QED.
28. This remark of course is not meant to suggest that Galileo’s kinematics is on a par
reduce to testing these alternative hypotheses, according to some sort of
hypothetico-deductive procedure.
No wonder many philosophers of science—including Feyerabend’s
(1975) famous analysis of Galileo’s tower argument—have concluded that
there was an element of propaganda in Galileo. In the end, Galileo was in-
venting new auxiliary dynamic hypotheses (be it circular inertia for the
tower argument, or the aforementioned one about uniformly accelerated
motion), and there was no intrinsic reason for the scientiªc community
to shift to Galileo’s new science, apart from the propaganda that ªnally
gathered scientists’ consensus around Galileo. I think that Feyerabend
captured very nicely the theory-ladeness of observation in Galileo’s strat-
egy, but went astray in concluding that Galileo ‘invented’ a new concep-
tual system and used propaganda to defend it. This conclusion follows—
I believe—from a widespread skepticism among philosophers of science
about the possibility of choosing between alternative hypotheses that can
both accommodate the available evidence. And this skepticism is, of
course, nothing but a consequence of the empiricist tradition about ‘sav-
ing the phenomena’.
By contrast with this tradition, I want to suggest that the particular
use Galileo made of the postulate in backing up the quasi-demonstration
of the supposition, from which the law of free fall follows, can be inter-
preted along Kant’s lines as a constitutive a priori element in the phenome-
non of free fall. Namely, for the sake of experiencing uniformly accelerated
motion, we must constitute the kinematical properties of free-falling bodies
according to the aforementioned supposition (no matter how counterintu-
itive the postulate necessary to back it up). Moreover, we need to subsume
these kinematical properties under the causal concept of a force such as for
instance Galileo’s ‘impeto’, despite the fact that Galileo’s notion of
‘impeto’ (as weight times speed) was still reminiscent of the Archimedean
science of weight and was not the exact causal story about free-falling bod-
ies. From a Kantian perspective, what matters is that for the very ªrst
time with Galileo, physics was not regarded as introducing hypotheses to
save the phenomena, but instead as a science whose secure foundations de-
pended on the speciªc mathematical–physical way in which phenomena
were constituted.29 This is the central contribution that to Kant’s eyes Gali-
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with Aristotelian physics. It is instead a remark about how philosophers of science have
sometimes looked at the transition from Aristotelian physics to Galilean kinematics, be-
cause of their (more or less tacit) endorsement of the view of ready-made phenomena
(which is the target of this paper).
29. Let me clarify this important point in response to a referee’s comment that one
thing is to claim that Galileo’s demonstration of the law of free fall required the use of some
leo’s mathematization of nature made to the scientiªc revolution from Ar-
istotelian to Newtonian physics.
5. Conclusion
To sum up and conclude, Kant suggested a radically new conception of
phenomena, according to which a phenomenon, say the phenomenon of
uniformly accelerated free-falling objects, is something that from the very
outset we have mathematically–geometrically constituted as having certain
spatio-temporal properties (for instance, the property of acquiring the same
speeds over different inclined planes with the same height), and, most im-
portantly, subsumed under a causal concept by tracing those spatio-temporal
properties back to the concept of a moving force, such as Galileo’s
‘impeto’. In this speciªc sense, Galileo exempliªed Kant’s Copernican
turn by showing how the phenomena that scientists investigate are not
ready-made for us to either save them or give a literally true story of them,
but instead they have built in them some a priori elements that we have
then to extract and prove through experiment.
We can now understand why, according to Kant, Galileo marks the
beginning of modern physics by displaying a unique and distinctive sci-
entiªc methodology: we can gain scientiªc knowledge of nature only
through principles of reason, on the one hand, and through experiments
thought out in accordance with these principles, on the other hand. In
other words, we can gain scientiªc knowledge of nature only by making
appearances conform to our way of representing, rather than trying hard to
make our hypotheses conform to nature. And this is why, as I hope to have
clariªed, Galileo’s method ªnds natural echoes in Kant’s Copernican turn,
and as such it is all the more relevant to address epistemological problems
that still trouble philosophers of science today.
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causal / dynamical concept (e.g. impeto); another thing is to claim that without that causal
/ dynamical concept, the phenomenon in question would be unintelligible, which seems
prima facie questionable since Galileo could successfully describe the experimental appara-
tus of the inclined plane without resorting to such a concept. As the discussion above was
meant to show, Galileo could not in fact describe the experimental apparatus of the in-
clined plane as instantiating uniformly accelerated motion without making the series of as-
sumptions just described. I think this objection buys into and originates from deeply
rooted realist intuitions about phenomena as being ready-made, with science giving a true
description of them (via demonstrations, for instance). As I clariªed in the Introduction,
the main motivation behind the Kantian view is precisely the rejection of such deeply
rooted metaphysical intuitions. From a Kantian point of view, phenomena are constituted
by ascribing spatio-temporal properties and subsuming them under causal / dynamical
concepts, as I have clariªed in this paper.
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